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747 
FAST-TRACK DISPARITIES IN THE POST-
BOOKER WORLD: RE-EXAMINING ILLEGAL 
REENTRY SENTENCING POLICIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider this typical illegal reentry case: at the age of sixteen, Miguel 
Medrano-Duran left Mexico and illegally came to the United States.1 Over 
the next five years he lived in Chicago, Illinois, was convicted of several 
crimes, and spent time in county jail.2 In 2004 Medrano-Duran was 
ultimately deported to Mexico but returned to Chicago just months later.3 
Now, because he has a criminal history and does not have permission to be 
in the country, Medrano-Duran has committed the federal crime of illegal 
reentry.4 Even though he did not commit any other crimes after reentering 
the United States, Medrano-Duran’s status as an illegal immigrant and his 
criminal record subject him to a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 
fifty-seven months of incarceration under federal law.5 
Like the great majority of illegal reentry offenders, Medrano-Duran 
asserted no pretrial rights and made a quick decision to plead guilty.6 
Unlike a growing minority of defendants in districts with “fast-track” or 
“early disposition” programs, however, Medrano-Duran received nothing 
 
 
 1. See United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 2. Id. In 2000 Medrano-Duran was convicted of criminal trespass to a vehicle and was given 
probation. In 2001 he forcibly took a wristwatch from an individual and received 180 days in jail as 
punishment. Later that same year, Medrano-Duran was charged with burglary of a motor vehicle and 
with theft, and spent an unknown length of time in a “boot camp” facility. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2000) provides: 
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens: Notwithstanding subsection (a) 
of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection—(1) whose removal was 
subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, 
crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien 
shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both . . . .  
 5. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 6. Id. Of all defendants sentenced for immigration offenses from October 1, 2004, through 
January 11, 2005, 98.7% pled guilty rather than go to trial. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, TABLE 11, GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS IN EACH 
PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY, PRE-BOOKER (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/ 
2005/table11_pre.pdf. Similarly, 98.2% of immigration defendants sentenced from January 12 through 
September 30, 2005, entered a guilty plea. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, TABLE 11, GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS IN EACH PRIMARY 
OFFENSE CATEGORY, POST-BOOKER (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/table 
11_post.pdf.  
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from the U.S. Attorney in exchange for his cooperation.7 “Fast-track 
programs allow a prosecutor to offer a defendant a reduced sentence in 
exchange for a pre-indictment guilty plea.”8 Judge Kennelly, who decided 
Medrano-Duran’s case, explained that “[f]ast track programs for illegal re-
entry cases have existed for a number of years in some districts, primarily 
districts on the Mexican border with a large number of illegal re-entry 
cases.”9 Thirteen federal districts currently employ fast-track programs to 
process more efficiently illegal reentry cases similar to Medrano-
Duran’s.10 “The purpose of these programs was and is to facilitate prompt 
and easy disposition of cases to reduce the burdens they impose in those 
districts—there was not enough physical space to house detained 
defendants, and there were not enough prosecutors to handle all the cases 
brought to them.”11 
Until the Supreme Court’s landmark January 2005 decision in United 
States v. Booker,12 the United States Sentencing Guidelines13 (“the 
Guidelines”) governed the length of sentence a criminal defendant could 
receive in federal courts.14 Pre-Booker, the Guidelines mandated that 
 
 
 7. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 8. Erin T. Middleton, Note, Fast-Track to Disparity: How Federal Sentencing Policies Along 
the Southwest Border Are Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines and Violating Equal Protection, 
2004 UTAH L. REV. 827, 827 (2004). 
 9. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 10. Those districts are Arizona, Central District of California, Eastern District of California, 
Northern District of California, Southern District of California, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Southern District of Texas, Western District of Texas, and the Western District of 
Washington. See Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for a 
Non-Guideline Sentence Based on the Existence of Fast-Track Programs at 46, United States v. 
Krukowski, No. 04 Cr. 1308 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 10, 2005), available at http://sentencing. 
typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/61005_govt_opposition_to_sg_variance_due_to_fasttra
ck.pdf [hereinafter Government Krukowski Memo] (memo from Deputy Attorney General James 
Comey verifying that fast-track programs are currently approved and in place in the districts listed). 
Eight districts employ “departure-based” programs, reducing the applicable Guidelines range when 
certain conditions are met. Id. at 31–40. Four districts, including the Central, Northern, and Southern 
Districts of California, use “charge bargaining” programs. Id. See also infra note 16. The Western 
District of Washington uses a combination program: charge bargaining for defendants with minor 
criminal histories and a departure-based program for defendants with more severe criminal histories. 
Government Krukowski Memo, at 39–40.  
 11. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 12. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 13. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 
(2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/tabcon05_1.htm [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
 14. Using a two-step formula consisting of (1) the crime committed and (2) the defendant’s 
criminal history, federal judges used the Guidelines to determine the permissible range within which 
they could sentence the defendant. See MANUAL, § 1B1.1, Application Instructions (2005); see also 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–34 (“The Guidelines as written, however, are not advisory; they are 
mandatory and binding on all judges. . . . Because they are binding on judges, we have consistently 
held that the Guidelines have the force and effect of laws.”). 
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Medrano-Duran would receive between fifty-seven and seventy-one 
months in prison in districts without fast-track programs.15 In districts with 
fast-track programs, such as the Southern District of California, Medrano-
Duran would receive no more than thirty months in prison.16  
Judges in non-fast-track districts have generally rejected the argument 
that this significant disparity is grounds for “departure”17 from the 
mandatory Guideline range.18 In the post-Booker world, however, the 
judiciary has new freedom to vary from the (now advisory) Guideline 
ranges, and several courts have done so.19 Because the Booker opinion 
places new emphasis on reducing sentencing disparities for similarly 
situated defendants,20 fast-track programs may now provide a fertile 
ground for sentence reductions never available before.  
This Note examines the use of fast-track programs to deal with illegal 
reentry offenders, and argues that the district-to-district sentencing 
disparities created by such programs should be eliminated by 
implementing a nationwide early disposition policy. Part II of this Note 
discusses the history of fast-track programs, from their inception in 
Southern California to their official recognition by Congress in 2003. Part 
 
 
 15. See Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (identifying the Guidelines sentencing range for 
Medrano-Duran, at offense level twenty-one and criminal history category IV, as fifty-seven to 
seventy-one months’ imprisonment). MANUAL, supra note 13, § 2L1.2 (2005). U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, CHAPTER FIVE–PART A–SENTENCING TABLE, available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/2005guid/5a.htm. The offense level / criminal history category system used by the Guidelines is 
complicated and warrants further explanation that is unnecessary for the understanding of this Note. 
For a quick tutorial on the Sentencing Table, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
COMMENTARY TO SENTENCING TABLE, CHAPTER FIVE–PART A–SENTENCING TABLE, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/tabcon05_1.htm. 
 16. The Northern, Central, and Southern Districts of California’s charge-bargaining fast-track 
programs allow 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (illegal reentry) offenders to plead to one or two counts under 8 
U.S.C. § 1325 (improper entry) instead. Generally, defendants with criminal histories receive two 
counts and serve thirty-month sentences, while defendants with clean records or only minor arrests 
plead to one count and receive sentences of sixty days. All offenders are required to “(1) waive 
indictment, (2) file no motions, (3) plead guilty within 60 days of arraignment, (4) stipulate to removal 
after completion of the sentence, (5) agree to immediate sentencing, and (6) waive appeal and 
collateral attack.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, TESTIMONY OF CHIEF JUDGE MARILYN L. HUFF, S. 
DIST. OF CAL. BEFORE THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N CONCERNING FAST TRACK OR EARLY 
DISPOSITION PROGRAMS, at 23 (2003), http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/Huff.pdf [hereinafter 
HUFF TESTIMONY]. 
 17. “Downward departure. In the federal sentencing guidelines, a court’s imposition of a 
sentence more lenient than the standard guidelines propose, as when the court concludes that a 
criminal’s history is less serious than it appears.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (8th ed. 2004); see 
also MANUAL, supra note 13, § 5K2.0 (2005) (policy statement explaining permissible grounds for 
departure). 
 18. See generally Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 19. See generally Part II.E and accompanying notes. 
 20. Booker, 543 U.S. at 252 (“[T]he sentencing statute’s basic aim [is] ensuring similar sentences 
for those who have committed similar crimes in similar ways.”). 
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II also summarizes the case law, before and after the Booker decision, 
addressing the sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs and 
whether the disparities constitute grounds for more lenient sentencing than 
the Guidelines recommend. Part III discusses in more depth some of the 
arguments for and against fast-track programs. Finally, Part IV suggests 
that a nationwide fast-track program is the best way to ensure uniform 
sentences and resolve the disparity debate in the district and circuit courts. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Birth of Fast-Track 
Fast-track programs are made possible by the principle of prosecutorial 
discretion: the notion that prosecutors have the right to decide who, what, 
when, where, and why they will bring charges, so long as those decisions 
are not made in an inherently discriminatory manner.21 The Supreme 
Court has long held that, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to 
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring 
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”22 As a result, 
prosecutors have a powerful bargaining chip with which to encourage 
guilty pleas.23 By offering lesser charges as a “reward” to illegal reentry 
 
 
 21. “Prosecutorial discretion. A prosecutor’s power to choose from the options available in a 
criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining, and recommending 
a sentence to the court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004). 
It sometimes rests in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney to decide what charges to file, 
against whom, when, and in what court a prosecution should be brought. While prosecutorial 
discretion as to whom to prosecute is broad, it is not unfettered and is subject to constitutional 
constraints. . . . Within limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of 
chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself 
a federal constitutional violation by the prosecutor so long as the selection is not deliberately 
based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. . . . 
Public perception of the criminal justice system is one of a broad spectrum of factors a 
prosecutor may properly consider in the exercise of his or her charging discretion. 
27 C.J.S. District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 29 (2005). “‘[T]he conscious exercise of some 
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation’ so long as ‘the selection 
was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.’” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (citation omitted). 
 22. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. 
 23. “To hold that the prosecutor’s desire to induce a guilty plea is an ‘unjustifiable standard,’ 
which, like race or religion, may play no part in his charging decision, would contradict the very 
premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining itself.” Id. at 364–65.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/6
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defendants who cooperate and quickly plead guilty, prosecutorial 
resources are preserved.24 
Because prosecutorial discretion results in a lower workload for the 
prosecutor, early disposition programs are most useful when caseloads are 
high.25 That was the situation in the Southern District of California when 
the first fast-track program was born.26 Overwhelmed by illegal reentry 
cases, the district’s U.S. Attorney established an early disposition program 
for processing these offenders in a more efficient manner.27 Under the 
innovative system, instead of charging defendants under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b)28 (which carries a maximum penalty of five or fifteen years 
depending on the defendant’s criminal history), illegal reentrants are 
allowed to plead to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which carries only a two-year 
maximum sentence.29 In exchange for this leniency, the defendant gives 
up a variety of rights: 
The policy requires that the defendant waive indictment, enter a 
guilty plea at the first appearance before the district court, waive 
appeal of all sentencing issues, stipulate that the applicable 
guideline range exceeds the 2-year statutory maximum, stipulate to 
the 2-year sentence, and agree not to seek any downward 
adjustments or departures.30  
 
 
 24. Of course, prosecutorial discretion can also be used to inflate the charges brought against a 
defendant, and the Court has even allowed prosecutors to act in a retaliatory and threatening manner in 
deciding what charges to bring. See id. at 365. 
 25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Alan D. Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement in the Southern District of 
California, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 254, 254 (1996). “For two or more generations, more than 50% of 
those who attempted to enter the United States did so through the Southern District of California. Each 
year, up to 600,000 arrests were made here at a porous and largely unguarded border.” Id.  
 27. See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1995) (“On July 22, 1993, the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California implemented the fast-track 
policy for immigration defendants charged with violating § 1326(b).”).  
 28. See supra note 4. 
 29. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000) provides: 
(a) In general: Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who—(1) has been denied 
admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order 
of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter (2) enters, attempts to 
enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a 
place outside the United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous 
territory, the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for 
admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless 
such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance consent under this 
chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or 
both. 
 30. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d at 759. 
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In 1995, the Southern District of California program was officially 
sanctioned by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Estrada-Plata.31 
Rejecting a claim that the program was discriminatory, the court wrote, 
“we find absolutely nothing wrong (and, quite frankly, a great deal right) 
with such a practice. The policy benefits the government and the court 
system by relieving congestion. But more importantly, the policy benefits 
§ 1326(b) defendants by offering them a substantial sentence reduction.”32 
The program has since been extended by each of five subsequent U.S. 
Attorneys in the Southern District of California, and has been adopted in 
the Central, Eastern, and Northern Districts of California as well.33 With 
the number of arrests for illegal reentry in the Southern District of 
California continuing to climb each year, it appears that the district’s fast-
track program is still useful today in reducing caseloads and conserving 
prosecutorial resources.34  
B. Pre-Booker Fast-Track Litigation 
Federal courts in California handle more immigration cases than any 
other district, but there are also a large number of illegal reentry offenders 
apprehended in other parts of the country.35 The disparity in sentences 
 
 
 31. Id. at 761. 
 32. Id. The court continues: “These defendants have nothing to lose and much to gain from the 
fast-track policy. We flatly reject the contention that the policy is discriminatory.” Id. 
 33. See HUFF TESTIMONY, supra note 16, at 2 (“[S]ince 1994, the five successive U.S. Attorneys 
in our district have established fast track or early disposition programs while exercising their 
prosecutorial discretion.”); see also Written Testimony from Maria E. Stratton, Fed. Pub. Defender for 
the Cent. Dist. of Cal., to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, at 1–2, (Sept. 18, 2003), http://www.ussc.gov/ 
hearings/9_23_03/stratton.pdf [hereinafter Stratton Testimony] (stating when the fast-track program 
for the Central District of California was established, and explaining how it is applied to § 1326(b) 
defendants); supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing the districts employing fast-track 
programs).  
 34. See Federal Court Management Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (click 
on “District Courts” under each year, then choose “California Southern” in the drop-down menu; then 
click the “Generate” button) (documenting a steady increase in the volume of immigration offenses 
charged, from 41% of the total criminal caseload in 1999, peaking at 65% of the total criminal 
caseload in 2004, and constituting fully 54% of the total criminal caseload in 2005). 
 This trend might also indicate that fast-track programs are not a good deterrent to illegal 
immigration. See infra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 35. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, 
APPENDIX B, CALIFORNIA SOUTHERN (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/ 
cas99.pdf. The 204 immigration cases in the Southern District of New York, and especially the mere 
264 cases in the entire state of Utah, seem insignificant in comparison to the 1675 cases in California. 
These cases nevertheless produced 568 disparately sentenced defendants in districts other than the 
Southern District of California. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, APPENDIX B, NEW YORK SOUTHERN (2001), available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/ANNRPT/1999/nys99.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/6
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received by California defendants and those received by defendants in 
other states quickly became apparent to defense attorneys.36 In 1999 and 
2000, several (unsuccessful) attempts were made to secure sentence 
reductions (also known as “downward departures” from the Guidelines)37 
on the basis of sentencing disparities created by California’s fast-track 
programs.38  
The first attempt at a downward departure based on fast-track 
disparities was launched in the Central District of California (before that 
district adopted a fast-track program of its own), in the case of United 
States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez.39 In 1995, Rogelio Banuelos-Rodriguez 
pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326.40 “At sentencing, [Banuelos-Rodriguez] argued for a downward 
departure from the sentencing guideline range based on an alleged 
discrepancy between the length of sentences received by § 1326 violators 
prosecuted in the Central District of California and the length of sentences 
received by § 1326 violators in the Southern District of California.41 
Finding that sentencing disparities were an impermissible grounds for 
departure, the district court sentenced Banuelos-Rodriguez within the 
mandatory Guideline range: seventy months in prison followed by three 
 
 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, APPENDIX B, UTAH (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/ 
1999/ut99.pdf. 
 36. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 2L1.2 (2005) (unlawfully entering or remaining in the United 
States). The base-offense level for unlawful entry is 8. Under California’s fast-track program, a 
defendant pleads to either one or two counts of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), resulting in an offense 
level of either 8 or 16. The result is a sentence of either six or twenty-four months. See MANUAL, 
supra note 13, CHAPTER FIVE–PART A–SENTENCING TABLE, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
2005guid/tabcon05_1.htm. In a district without a fast-track program, a defendant guilty of violating 8 
U.S.C. § 1326(b) (the same crime for which defendants in California receive fast-track status) qualifies 
for a sixteen-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(1)(A) of the Guidelines, bringing the base-offense level 
to 24. The result is a sentence (based on criminal history category–which will be at least III if 
defendant has a prior felony) of between 63 and 125 months. See id. Clearly, there is a disparity 
between the sentences meted out for violation of § 1326(b) in fast-track districts (6–24 months) and 
the sentences imposed for the same crime in non-fast-track districts (63–125 months). 
 37. A “downward departure” is an official judgment, arrived at through Guidelines-prescribed 
procedures, that a more lenient sentence is appropriate in a particular case. See MANUAL, supra note 
13, § 5K2.0 (2005) (policy statement explaining grounds for departure). See also supra note 17. 
 38. See United States v. Armenta-Castro, 227 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
 39. 215 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2000). The Central District of California adopted a fast-track program 
in 2003, after the Attorney General officially sanctioned such programs and laid out guidelines for 
their implementation. See generally Stratton Testimony, supra note 33, at 2–3. Banuelos-Rodriguez 
was sentenced in 1995. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 971. 
 40. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 971. See supra notes 4 and 29 (full text of 8 U.S.C. § 1326). 
 41. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 971. 
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years of supervised release.42 On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision.43 
At about the same time that Banuelos-Rodriguez was sentenced, an 
illegal reentry defendant in the Southern District of New York was testing 
a similar argument in United States v. Bonnet-Grullon.44 Francis Bonnet-
Grullon was convicted for selling crack cocaine in New York State in 
1994.45 He was deported to the Dominican Republic in early 1995, but 
was subsequently arrested twice in 1997 in New York City for criminal 
possession of a controlled substance, and was charged federally with 
illegal reentry shortly thereafter.46 He pled guilty under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b), and was sentenced within the Guidelines range to seventy 
months in prison.47 Noting that “it is difficult to imagine a sentencing 
disparity less warranted than one which depends upon the accident of the 
judicial district in which the defendant happens to be arrested,” the court 
 
 
 42. Id. at 971. 
 43. United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Ninth 
Circuit sat first as a three-judge panel and found that it was error to treat sentencing disparities as a 
prohibited grounds for departure. United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 173 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 
1999) (withdrawn). Instead, the panel examined Banuelos-Rodriguez’s sentence through the Supreme 
Court’s Koon test for downward departures. Id. at 743. The relevant factors of the Koon test are:  
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’ “heartland” and 
make of it a special, or unusual, case?  
2) Has the [United States Sentencing] Commission forbidden departures based on those 
features?  
3) If not, has the [United States Sentencing] Commission encouraged departures based on 
those features?  
4) If not, has the [United States Sentencing] Commission discouraged departures based on 
those features?  
United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996) (citing United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st 
Cir. 1993)). Finally, the panel noted that “it is the task of Congress, not the federal courts, to identify 
factors which are categorically forbidden as grounds for departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.” 
Banuelos-Rodriguez, 173 F.3d at 747. 
 On remand, the district court again declined to grant a downward departure, and the Ninth Circuit 
agreed to rehear Banuelos-Rodriguez’s appeal en banc. United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 195 F.3d 
454 (9th Cir. 1999). This resulted in a withdrawal of the panel opinion and the issuing of a new 
opinion affirming the district court’s decision. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 978. The court 
ultimately held that “separation of powers concerns prohibit us from reviewing a prosecutor’s charging 
decisions absent a prima facie showing that it rested on an impermissible basis, such as gender, race or 
denial of a constitutional right.” Id. at 977 (citing United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 
1993)). Challenges to fast-track policies could thus only be directed toward the executive branch, 
which determines charging practices for prosecutors. Id. 
 44. 53 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 45. Id. at 431.  
 46. Id. 
 47. United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 693 (2d Cir. 2000).  
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nonetheless found itself bound by Second Circuit precedent to deny 
Bonnet-Grullon’s request for a downward departure.48  
On appeal, the Second Circuit analyzed the Sentencing Commission’s 
intent in dealing with such sentencing disparities.49 Finding that Bonnet-
Grullon’s case was not “unusual” in any way,50 and arguing that an 
existing Guidelines policy statement51 allows for exactly the type of 
prosecutorial discretion utilized by fast-track programs, a three judge panel 
affirmed the district court.52 
The final pre-Booker fast-track opinion followed closely on the heels of 
the Banuelos-Rodriguez and Bonnet-Grullon decisions. In United States v. 
Armenta-Castro,53 the Tenth Circuit held that “the governing provisions of 
the United States Code and the Sentencing Guidelines categorically 
proscribe the consideration of sentencing disparities flowing from the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining 
practices.”54 The Tenth Circuit, like the Second, found that the 
commentary to § 6B1.2 of the Guidelines implicitly prohibits judicial 
interference in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by setting forth 
criteria for when plea agreements can and cannot be accepted.55 The court 
also advanced a new argument against consideration of sentencing 
disparities created by fast-track programs: “[i]nterjection of this issue into 
sentencing proceedings would mandate cumbersome and involved 
evidentiary hearings in every case.”56 Armenta-Castro appeared to be the 
 
 
 48. Bonnet-Grullon, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 435–36. See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575 (2d 
Cir. 1991) holding that the Sentencing Commission and Congress are free to address the issue of 
sentencing disparities created by non-uniform plea bargaining practices, and that the Sentencing 
Commission’s decision not to make major changes in plea bargaining practices was an implicit 
approval that such disparities are “warranted”). 
 49. Bonnet-Grullon, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 703. Citing a Guidelines policy statement published by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, the court found that the Commission had forbidden departures based on 
sentencing disparities created by plea-bargaining. “The court may accept an agreement calling for 
dismissal of charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges if the remaining charges reflect 
the seriousness of the actual offense behavior. This requirement does not authorize judges to intrude 
upon the charging discretion of the prosecutor.” Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 13, § 6B1.2 
(commentary to the Guidelines policy statement referenced by the court)). 
 50. This is a reference to the Supreme Court’s Koon test for downward departure, set forth supra 
note 43.  
 51. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 6B1.2(a) (“In the case of a plea agreement that includes the 
dismissal of any charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges, . . . the court may accept the 
agreement.”). 
 52. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d at 709–10. 
 53. 227 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 54. Id. at 1258. 
 55. Id. at 1259. See supra note 51.  
 56. Armenta-Castro, 227 F.3d at 1259. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p747 Schendel book pages.doc4/19/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
756 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:747 
 
 
 
 
last word on fast-track disparities until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Booker.57 
C. Statutory Developments and the Growth of Fast-Track 
In 2003, Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools 
to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act.58 Among 
many other things, the Act officially sanctioned fast-track programs by 
mandating that the United States Attorney General set standards for such 
programs within six months.59 On September 22, 2003, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft sent two memos to “all Federal Prosecutors.”60 The first 
memo discussed the exceptions to a prosecutor’s “General Duty to Charge 
and Pursue the Most Serious, Readily Provable Offense in All Federal 
Prosecutions,” including situations where the district has authorized a fast-
track program.61 The memo also laid out “Department Policy Concerning 
Plea Agreements,” noting that the PROTECT Act authorizes federal 
prosecutors to agree to downward departures when a fast-track program is 
in place.62  
 
 
 57. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 58. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003 [hereinafter PROTECT Act], Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of UNITED STATES CODE TITLES 18, 21, 28, 42, 47, and FED. R. CRIM. P. 7). 
 59. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 675 (2003).  
Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the United States Sentencing 
Commission shall— . . . (2) promulgate, pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States 
Code— . . . (B) a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 
levels if the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition 
program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney . . . .  
 60. MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN ASHCROFT, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REGARDING DEPARTMENT POLICY CONCERNING CHARGING CRIMINAL OFFENSES, DISPOSITION OF 
CHARGES, AND SENTENCING (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/ 
September/03_ag_516.htm [hereinafter ASHCROFT MEMO I]; and MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY 
GENERAL JOHN ASHCROFT, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REGARDING DEPARTMENT PRINCIPLES FOR 
IMPLEMENTING AN EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OR “FAST-TRACK” PROSECUTION PROGRAM IN A 
DISTRICT (Sept. 27, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 134 (2003) [hereinafter ASHCROFT 
MEMO II]. 
 61. ASHCROFT MEMO I at 2–4. Other exceptions to a prosecutor’s general duty to charge and 
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense include when the sentence would not be affected (if 
the mandatory minimum sentence would be the same, regardless of which crime is charged), when the 
prosecutor reassesses the evidence post-indictment and changes his or her mind about what charge to 
pursue, when the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the prosecutor, when seeking 
statutory enhancements would discourage the defendant from pleading guilty, and “other exceptional 
circumstances.” Id. 
 62. Id. at 6–7.  
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The second memo laid out, in detail, the requirements for 
implementing a valid fast-track program.63 Stating that “[t]hese programs 
are properly reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as where the 
resources of a district would otherwise be significantly strained by the 
large volume of a particular category of cases,” the Attorney General 
required interested districts to submit a proposal demonstrating that certain 
conditions were met for whatever offense they sought to “fast-track.”64 
The memo also set forth “the minimum requirements for ‘fast-track’ plea 
agreement[s].”65  
On October 24, 2003, the Acting Deputy Attorney General approved 
twenty-six fast-track applications in fifteen districts.66 Of these, only 
thirteen specifically addressed the crime of illegal reentry.67 Those 
districts were: Arizona; Idaho; Nebraska; New Mexico; North Dakota; 
Oregon; the Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Districts of 
California; the Southern and Western Districts of Texas; and the Western 
 
 
 63. ASHCROFT MEMO II at 134–35.  
 64. Id. at 134. The required conditions are: 
(A)(1) the district confronts an exceptionally large number of a specific class of offenses 
within the district, and failure to handle such cases on an expedited or “fast-track” basis 
would significantly strain prosecutorial and judicial resources available in the district; or 
(2) the district confronts some other exceptional local circumstance with respect to a specific 
class of cases that justifies expedited disposition of such cases; 
(B) declination of such cases in favor of state prosecution is either unavailable or clearly 
unwarranted; 
(C) the specific class of cases consists of ones that are highly repetitive and present 
substantially similar fact scenarios; and  
(D) the cases do not involve an offense that has been designated by the Attorney General as a 
“crime of violence.” See 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (listing offenses designated by the Attorney 
General as “crimes of violence” for purposes of the DNA collection provisions of the USA 
PATRIOT Act). Id. at 134–35. 
 65. Id. at 135. The minimum requirements are:  
(i) The defendant agrees to a factual basis that accurately reflects his or her offense conduct; 
(ii) The defendant agrees not to file any of the motions described in Rule 12(b)(3), Fed. R. 
Crim. P. [a.k.a. “pretrial motions”]; 
(iii) The defendant agrees to waive appeal; and 
(iv) The defendant agrees to waive the opportunity to challenge his or her conviction under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 [a.k.a. “habeas petition”], except on the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 66. See Government Krukowski Memo, supra note 10, at 42 (memo from Deputy Attorney 
General James B. Comey verifying that fast-track programs are currently approved and in place in 
fifteen districts). 
 67. Id. Other approved fast-track programs included those dealing with drug cases arising along 
the border in Arizona, the Southern District of California, and the Southern District of Texas, drug 
backpacking cases in New Mexico, and drug courier cases arising out of John F. Kennedy 
International Airport in the Eastern District of New York, among others. Id. 
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District of Washington.68 All of these programs were renewed in 2004 and 
again in 2006.69  
D. An Unexpected Twist: United States v. Booker 
The thirteen illegal reentry fast-track programs operated without 
incident, and the circuit case law on the matter remained unchallenged, 
until the Supreme Court’s January 2005 decision in United States v. 
Booker.70 Holding for the first time that the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines violate criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial,71 the Court set out to preserve any and all elements of the Guidelines 
that were not unconstitutional.72 In this effort, the Court noted that 
“Congress’ basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the 
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.”73 Justice 
Breyer explained that one of the major reasons the Sentencing Guidelines 
were created was to counteract the disparities created by plea bargaining:  
The [Guidelines] reasonably assume that their efforts to move the 
trial-based sentencing process in the direction of greater sentencing 
uniformity would have a similar positive impact upon plea-
bargained sentences, for plea bargaining takes place in the shadow 
 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 3. According to an August 8, 2006 post on Professor Douglas A. Berman’s Sentencing 
Law and Policy blog, an unnamed source has informed him that “on Friday [August 4, 2006] the 
Justice Department re-authorized all existing ‘fast track’ programs (through something like December 
31, 2006) and authorized an additional 4 to 5 new programs in various districts.” Responding to an 
online poster’s request for official documentation of the August 4 fast-track renewal, Professor 
Berman posted this reply: “I don’t know, I don’t know, and I don’t know. I wonder if anyone has tried 
a FOIA request on DOJ’s fast-track documents.” DOUGLAS A. BERMAN, SENTENCING LAW AND 
POLICY, IMPORTANT DOJ Fast-track Policy Clarification!!, Aug. 8, 2006, http://sentencing.typepad. 
com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/08/important_fastt.html. 
 70. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 71. “Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding 
the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted 
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 244. Because a mandatory 
Guidelines system sometimes requires judges to consider facts neither found by a jury nor admitted by 
a defendant (when they consider the possible sentencing enhancements provided for each offense in 
the Guidelines Manual), the mandatory scheme is unconstitutional. See generally id. at 230–37. 
 72. The second half of the majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, carefully considered the 
possible constitutional remedies, and concluded that an advisory Guidelines system was what 
Congress most likely would have enacted if it knew that a mandatory system was unconstitutional. See 
id. at 249. (“[I]n light of today’s holding, we compare maintaining the Act as written with jury 
factfinding added (the dissenters’ proposed remedy) to the total invalidation of the statute, and 
conclude that Congress would have preferred the latter.”). 
 73. Id. at 253. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000), and MANUAL § 1A1.1(A)(3). 
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of (i.e., with an eye towards the hypothetical result of) a potential 
trial.74 
While the Court readily admitted that “[t]his system has not worked 
perfectly,” the majority nevertheless strained to preserve as much of the 
Guidelines system as constitutionally possible.75 
The Court noted that, even though some portions of the Guidelines 
were being excised as unconstitutional,76 “[t]he remainder of the [Federal 
Sentencing Reform] Act ‘functions independently.”77 The end result of the 
Booker holding is that the Guidelines are no longer binding on federal 
judges. However,  
[t]he [Federal Sentencing Reform] Act nonetheless requires judges 
to consider the Guidelines ‘sentencing range established for . . . the 
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category 
of defendant,’ the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy 
statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, 
and the need to provide restitution to victims.78 
The Court intended these factors, in combination with those set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),79 to guide sentencing judges post-Booker in 
determining whether to impose a Guidelines-range sentence, a reduced 
sentence, or even a longer sentence than the Guidelines recommend.80  
 
 
 74. Booker, 543 U.S. at 255.  
 75. See supra note 72. See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (“The other approach, which we now 
adopt, would (through severance and excision of two provisions) make the Guidelines system advisory 
while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real 
conduct—a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its 
Guidelines system to achieve.”). See also id. at 264. (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”). 
 76. See Booker, 534 U.S. at 258–65 (discussing why 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) are 
invalidated by the Booker opinion). 
 77. Id. at 266 (citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 259–60 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3), and (5)-
(7) (2000). 
 79. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000). The Booker opinion summarizes 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) 
as follows: “the Act . . . requires judges to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, 
and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training and medical 
care.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 260. 
 80. Circuit court opinions post-Booker present a complex and voluminous body of case law. The 
individual sentencing practices and the ever-changing nuances of post-Booker appellate practice are 
beyond the scope of this Note. For a helpful synopsis of the Booker opinion, visit Professor Douglas 
A. Berman’s “Booker Basics” at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/berman/booker.php.  
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E. Post-Booker Fast-Track Litigation: District Courts 
Post-Booker, the Federal Sentencing Reform Act’s directive to impose 
uniform sentences is in direct conflict with the freedom judges now have 
to vary from the Guidelines ranges.81 Seizing upon this opportunity to find 
new and fruitful grounds for variances from the Guidelines, defense 
attorneys in districts without fast-track programs have resurrected the 
disparity argument.82 Results have been mixed, but some illegal reentry 
defendants in non-fast-track districts have been successful in arguing for a 
more lenient sentence based on sentencing disparities and the new 
flexibility afforded to judges by Booker.83 
Less than a month after Booker became law, the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin considered the case of United States v. Galvez-Barrios, which 
involved an illegal reentry offender with a particularly sympathetic story.84 
After living in the United States for many years and parenting four 
children, Galvez-Barrios encountered a string of bad luck involving a self-
defense shooting, deportation, and rediscovery as an illegal alien after 
being stranded in his car during a snowstorm.85 The court wrote: “[a]s 
 
 
 81. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“True, judges must still consider the 
sentencing range contained in the Guidelines, but that range is now nothing more than a suggestion 
that may or may not be persuasive to a judge when weighed against the numerous other considerations 
listed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a).”). See also id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress’ demand in 
the PROTECT Act that departures from the Guidelines be closely regulated and monitored is 
eviscerated—for there can be no ‘departure’ from a mere suggestion. How will a judge go about 
determining how much deference to give to the applicable Guidelines range?”). 
 82. See cases cited at note 38, and accompanying text. The argument is as follows: if 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b) defendants in fast-track districts regularly receive lower sentences than illegal reentry 
offenders in non-fast-track districts, and if the disparity in sentences is unwarranted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(6), then the court may use that disparity as grounds for granting a variance from the normal 
Guidelines range (to bring a defendant’s sentence in line with those received by defendants in fast-
track districts). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Delgado, No. 6:05-cr-30-Orl-31KRS, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Fla. 
2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/presnell_ 
sentencing_opinion_us_v.%20Delgado.pdf (“the Court will exercise its discretion to reduce Delgado’s 
sentence by the equivalent of a 4-level departure in recognition of this sentencing disparity”).  
 84. 355 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis. 2005). Jose Galvez-Barrios had resided in the United States 
since the late 1970s. Id. at 959. He achieved permanent resident status in Chicago in 1986, and had 
four American-born children with his long-term girlfriend. Id. In 1993, Galvez-Barrios was attacked 
and robbed by a group of gang members and shot one of them to recover his property. Id. After the 
incident, he turned himself in and was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm. Id. In 1998 he 
was paroled and deported. Id. He reentered the United States in 2000 but was found and deported 
again in 2002. Id. Galvez-Barrios returned yet a third time, and lived peacefully in Chicago until 
January 2004 when he was rescued by sheriff’s deputies in a snowstorm and discovered as an illegal 
reentry offender. Id. at 959–60. 
 85. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d. at 958–60.  
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Booker directs, in determining defendant’s sentence I gave serious 
consideration to the advisory guidelines.”86  
Taking into account the defendant’s unusually hard-luck tale, the court 
was disturbed by the Guidelines range of fifty-seven to seventy-one 
months’ imprisonment,87 and “was also troubled by the unwarranted 
sentencing disparity under the Guidelines for § 1326 offenders.”88 
Concluding that “under Booker and § 3553(a)(6),89 it may be appropriate 
in some cases for courts to exercise their discretion to minimize the 
sentencing disparity that fast-track programs create,” the court sentenced 
Galvez-Barrios to only twenty-four months in prison—less than half the 
normal Guidelines range.90 Although recent developments in the Seventh 
Circuit indicate that this type of reduction is no longer proper,91 the 
Government has not noticed any appeal of Galvez-Barrios’s sentence.92 
The Eastern District of Virginia similarly reduced an illegal reentrant’s 
sentence from the Guidelines’ range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months 
to a mere twenty-four months of imprisonment in United States v. 
Ramirez-Ramirez.93 The court held that, “[i]n some cases, under Booker 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),94 it may be appropriate for the Court to exercise 
its discretion in order to minimize the sentencing disparities that exist in 
 
 
 86. Id. at 961 (emphasis added).  
 87. Id. at 963 (Galvez-Barrios’s crime carries an offense level of 21 and a criminal history 
category of IV, placing him in Zone D of the Sentencing Table, indicating a range of fifty-seven to 
seventy-one months’ imprisonment); see MANUAL, supra note 13, § 2L1.2, and U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, CH. 5 PT. A SENTENCING TBL, available at http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/ 
tabcon05_1.htm. 
 88. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (citing Erin T. Middleton, Note, Fast-Track to 
Disparity: How Federal Sentencing Policies Along the Southwest Border Are Undermining the 
Sentencing Guidelines and Violating Equal Protection, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 827 (2004), and noting 
that defendants in the Southern District of California are “allowed to plead guilty to an offense 
carrying a two year statutory maximum penalty”). 
 89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) 
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider— 
. . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct . . . . 
 90. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 963–64. The Eastern District of Wisconsin later extended 
this principle in a different case: United States v. Peralta-Espinoza, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (E.D. Wis. 
2005).  
 91. See United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2006). See also infra note 
123 and accompanying text. 
 92. A Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) search reveals that the case filed was 
closed by the court on February 2, 2005 (the date the opinion was issued), and no appeal has been 
noticed by either party. 
 93. 365 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733 (E.D.Va. 2005). 
 94. See supra note 89 (full text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). 
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cases involving illegal reentry.”95 Although the Fourth Circuit later 
became the only circuit to roundly reject this approach,96 the Government 
has allowed Ramirez-Ramirez’s sentence to stand.97  
Other districts followed suit. In May 2006 Judge Presnell of the Middle 
District of Florida reduced Jairo Modesto Miranda-Garcia’s sentence by 
eight levels, bringing his sentence from the forty-one to fifty-one month 
range down to eighteen months of imprisonment.98 After noting the 
sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs, Judge Presnell 
justified his decision on the grounds that he had considered “all of the 
statutory sentencing factors, and particularly 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 
. . . .”99 One month later, Judge Presnell used the same logic to reduce a 
different illegal reentrant’s sentence in United States v. Delgado.100  
In August 2005 the Northern District of Illinois issued the second 
opinion within the Seventh Circuit to find that sentencing disparities 
created by fast-track programs were unwarranted: United States v. 
Medrano-Duran.101 This Seventh Circuit trend soon came to an end, 
though, with an ambiguous ruling that may bar the consideration of fast-
track disparities as grounds for a sentence reduction.102  
 
 
 95. Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (citing Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 962; 
Bonnet-Grullon, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 435) (emphasis added). The court cited extensively from statistics 
published by the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center and the United States Sentencing 
Commission as proof that significant sentencing disparities exist among illegal reentry defendants. See 
Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 731–32. 
 96. See United States v. Perez-Pina, 453 F.3d 236, 242–44 (4th Cir. 2006). See also infra notes 
121–22 and accompanying text. 
 97. A PACER search reveals that the Government withdrew its notice of appeal on June 9, 2005. 
 98. United States v. Miranda-Garcia, No. 6:05-CR-202-ORL-31DAB, 2006 WL 1208013 (M.D. 
Fla. May 4, 2006). After noting the sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs, Judge 
Presnell justified his decision on the grounds that he had considered “all of the statutory sentencing 
factors, and particularly 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) . . . .” Id. at *2. According to the PACER docket 
report, the United States originally noticed appeal of Miranda-Garcia’s sentence on June 2, 2006, but 
the court of appeals dismissed the appeal at the request of the government on July 24, 2006. Miranda-
Garcia’s reduced sentence will be allowed to stand. 
 99. Id. at *2. 
 100. No. 6:05-cr-30-Orl-31KRS (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2005), http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/files/presnell_sentencing_opinion_us_v.%20Delgado.pdf. The court’s 
Memorandum Sentencing Opinion indicates that two other judges in the Middle District of Florida had 
previously ordered similar variances: United States v. Villalobos, No. 6:04-CR-206-Orl-28JGG (M.D. 
Fla. Apr. 18, 2005); United States v. Maldonado-Sanchez, No. 8:03-CR-371-T-30TGW (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 30, 2004). Delgado, 6:05-CR-30-orl-31KRS at 4.  
 101. 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D.Ill. 2005) (“Reduction of a sentence for a defendant in a non-
fast track district tends to reduce disparity when viewed on a national level.”). See also supra notes 1–
7 and accompanying text; Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 963; supra notes 84–92 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. See Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d at 555; infra note 123 and accompanying text. A PACER 
search reveals that, despite the Seventh Circuit’s judgment in Galicia-Cardenas, no appeal has been 
noticed by the government in the Medrano-Duran case. It appears the sentence will stand. Id. 
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Finally, Judge Sweet, in the Southern District of New York, granted 
two separate variances in late 2005 on the grounds that sentencing 
disparities based on geography are unwarranted under the definition of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).103 In both cases, Judge Sweet attempted to bring the 
defendants’ sentences in line with those of illegal reentry defendants 
prosecuted in fast-track districts by instituting a four-point offense-level 
reduction.104 
But not all courts have been willing to consider fast-track disparities in 
a different light post-Booker. In United States v. Perez-Chavez, the Central 
District of Utah resurrected the pre-Booker rationale for rejecting 
sentencing disparities as grounds for a more lenient sentence.105 Treating 
the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Armenta-Castro106 as 
controlling law, the Perez-Chavez court held that Congress had sanctioned 
sentencing disparities when it ordered the creation of official fast-track 
guidelines in the PROTECT Act of 2003.107 The court also extended the 
Tenth Circuit’s holding that challenges to the U.S. Attorneys’ legitimate 
use of prosecutorial discretion are better directed to the executive branch 
than to the judiciary.108  
 
 
 103. See United States v. Linval, No. 05 CR 345(RWS), 2005 WL 3215155 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 
2005); United States v. Santos, 406 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Both opinions use nearly 
identical language and were issued within three weeks of each other. Id. The Second Circuit has not 
definitively ruled on whether fast-track sentencing disparities are proper grounds for reducing an 
illegal reentry defendant’s sentence, so Judge Sweet’s opinions appear to be good law. See United 
States v. Urena, 173 F. App’x 72, 73 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006); infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 104. Linval, 2005 WL 3215155 at *7; Santos, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
 105. 422 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D. Utah 2005). Perez-Chavez’s wife had illegally reentered the United 
States in order to receive necessary medical care while she was pregnant. Id. at 1257. After their child 
was born prematurely and the defendant’s father-in-law became terminally ill, Perez-Chavez followed 
his wife and also illegally reentered the United States. Id. at 1257–58. 
 106. 227 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2000). See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 107. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (“Congress has concluded that advantages stemming 
from fast-track programs outweigh their disadvantages, and that any disparity that results from fast-
track programs is not ‘unwarranted.’ . . . If Congress is willing to accept that disparity, so must this 
court.”). See supra note 59 (setting forth the text of the PROTECT Act authorizing fast-track 
programs).  
 108. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (“Criminal prosecution is the ‘special province’ of the 
Executive, stemming from the President’s constitutional responsibility to ‘take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’”) (citations omitted). The court went on to grant Perez-Chavez’s motion for a 
variance “due to extraordinary family circumstances” and sentenced him to only eight months of 
imprisonment. Id. at 1269. 
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One judge in the Southern District of New York also refused to vary 
from the guidelines, but only because the particular defendant’s conduct 
did not warrant any special leniency.109 The court recognized that 
sentencing disparities exist and reserved the right to grant a reduction if an 
appropriate case arose.110 No other district courts appear to have addressed 
the issue of whether fast-track disparities can justify sentence reductions 
for certain illegal reentrants.  
F. Post-Booker Fast-Track Litigation: Appellate Courts 
The most significant developments in the fast-track sentencing 
disparity debate have emerged from the appellate courts. As of August 
2006 all but four of the circuits have made some attempt to resolve 
whether fast-track disparities warrant lower sentences.111 Only the D.C. 
Circuit and the Third Circuit remain silent—perhaps a testament to those 
circuits’ low volume of illegal reentry cases.112 The First Circuit has 
repeatedly been faced with the question of whether fast-track sentencing 
disparities warrant variance from the Guidelines, but each time the court 
has avoided resolving the issue by ruling against the defendant on other 
 
 
 109. See United States v. Duran, 399 F. Supp. 2d 543, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
Some courts have found downward adjustments warranted in illegal reentry cases where the 
defendant did not commit any further serious criminal offenses after illegally reentering the 
United States, regularly maintained gainful employment, or supported for substantial periods 
of time households of family members who were citizens or legal residents. Duran’s conduct 
after reentry, however, does not provide a basis for a downward adjustment to his sentence on 
any of these grounds. After illegally reentering the United States, Duran was convicted of a 
drug sale—the same offense for which he was convicted prior to his deportation. In fact, 
Duran was convicted of six separate offenses related to drug sales or possession prior to his 
deportation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 110. Id. at 548.  
[T]he Court is mindful, as suggested above, of the reality that until these issues are ultimately 
resolved by higher courts, sentencing disparities are developing within the district in these 
cases among the judges who consider, at some point and in some measure, the fast-track and 
double-counting factors and those who do not, and that conceivably those differences may 
provide some grounds for adjustment under this criterion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § Id. 3553(a).  
Id.  
 111. See infra notes 116–23 and accompanying text. 
 112. District courts in the Third Circuit, which are comprised of the districts of Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Delaware, together handled only 158 criminal immigration cases in 2005, and 
immigration offenses constituted only six percent of the total criminal caseload throughout the Circuit. 
See Federal Court Management Statistics 2005 District Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
fcmstat/index.html (click on “District Courts” under 2005; then choose the name of the district in the 
drop-down menu and click the “Generate” button). No district in the Third Circuit operates a fast-track 
program. See supra note 10. 
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grounds.113 Similarly, in an unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit has 
acknowledged that the issue is ripe for resolution, but has thus far declined 
to establish any guiding principles.114 
The remaining circuit court opinions fall into three categories. First, 
there are the circuits that believe fast-track sentencing disparities are but 
one of many factors to be considered at sentencing, and that the balance of 
those factors may or may not create an imperative to vary downwards 
from the Guidelines.115 Because each case is different, no blanket rule can 
be made regarding variances based on fast-track disparities—sometimes 
such a variance will be reasonable and other times it will not. The Tenth 
Circuit was the first to articulate this principle in United States v. Morales-
Chaires, decided in December 2005.116 By July 2006 both the Sixth 
 
 
 113. See United States v. Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005). Rejecting defendant’s 
equal protection claim and ignoring the other implications of fast-track disparities, the court held that 
“the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maine are in the best position to 
evaluate whether the local conditions in Maine warrant such a program[,]” and offered several reasons 
why a district may in fact choose not to implement a fast-track program. Id. at 53. “For example, they 
may find that the absence of the program could permit swifter adjudication with corresponding 
benefits to aliens, or that [they] could achieve greater deterrence through harsher sentences.” Id.  
 United States v. Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005). The Court first dismissed a creative 
nondelegation argument raised by the defendant: “[h]e argues that by virtue of the PROTECT Act 
provision, Congress delegated excessive legislative power to the Attorney General to decide when 
districts may install fast-track programs and when they may not.” Id at 26. The court then examined 
the district court’s sentence for plain error and found none. Id. at 30. At the end of the opinion, the 
court briefly discusses fast-track sentencing disparities in a footnote: 
It is arguable that even post-Booker, it would never be reasonable to depart downward based 
on disparities between fast-track and non-fast-track jurisdictions given Congress’ clear (if 
implied) statement in the PROTECT Act provision that such disparities are acceptable. . . . 
Because we resolve the question in this case on Booker plain-error grounds, we need not 
reach that or any other issue of reasonableness. 
Id. at 30 n.3. 
 United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (“In any event, the district 
court ruled that the defendant had not furnished a factual basis for assessing the extent of the 
disparities or provided a reason why to take them into account. . . . In declining to alter the sentence on 
this ground, the district court did not act unreasonably.”).  
 114. See Urena, 173 F. App’x 72, 73 n.2 (“While this is certainly an intriguing question ripe for 
resolution by this Court, we need not reach this particular issue here, because even assuming the 
district court should have considered sentencing disparities created by the use of fast-track programs, 
Urena’s circumstances in this case, including his criminal history, more than offset any alleged fast-
track disparities.”).  
 115. See infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 116. 430 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).  
We conclude that, in this particular case, we need not resolve whether sentencing disparities 
caused by the existence of fast-track programs in some jurisdictions are or are not, or may be 
in certain circumstances, considered unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6). Section 3553(a)(6)’s 
directive to sentencing courts to avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendant[s] with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct” is but one 
of several factors for a court to consider in determining a reasonable sentence. 
Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).  
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Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit had adopted this approach,117 holding that 
courts are not required to reduce sentences based on fast-track disparities, 
but that such a departure could be appropriate in the right situation. 
The second approach focuses on the definition of “unwarranted 
sentenc[ing] disparities” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).118 Beginning with the 
Eighth Circuit in February 2006,119 three appellate courts, including the 
 
 
 The Tenth Circuit later articulated this same rationale in ruling against defendants in the cases 
United States v. Gomez-Castillo, No. 05-4139, 2006 WL 1166119, slip op. at *5 (10th Cir. May 3, 
2006) (“Consistent with our decision in Morales-Chaires, the court found that those disparities did not 
trump the remaining § 3553(a) sentencing factors; rather, disparities are a factor, to be considered 
along with the remaining § 3553(a) factors.”); United States v. Flores-Perez, No. 05-4182, 2006 WL 
1389116, slip op. at *2 (10th Cir. May 18, 2006); United States v. Salazar-Alpizar, No. 05-1368, 2006 
WL 1376870, slip op. at *5 (10th Cir. May 19, 2006). 
 117. See United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006). “Section 3553(a) enumerates 
several factors that must be considered to determine a reasonable sentence, and the ‘need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities,’ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), is one of them.” Id. at 1252. 
 See also United States v. Hernandez-Fierros, 453 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2006). “The rationale of this 
court’s sister circuits is persuasive. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparity is only one of the factors that a district court should consider in determining an 
appropriate sentence.” Id. at 313. The Sixth Circuit had earlier issued an unpublished opinion that 
seemed to take a more hard-line stance against sentence reductions based on fast-track disparities, but 
the court appears to abandon that line of thought in the Hernandez-Fierros opinion. See United States 
v. Hernandez-Cervantes, 161 F. App’x 508 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 118. See supra note 89.  
 119. See United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2006). The Eighth Circuit quickly 
used this opinion to dispose of a slew of other illegal reentry appeals premised on failure to consider 
fast-track sentencing disparities. See, e.g., United States v. Vergara-Viernes, 175 F. App’x 100, 101 
(8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vasquez-Cardona, 175 F. App’x 105, 106 (8th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Cabrera-Villegas, 170 F. App’x 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Silva, No. 05-3076, 
2006 WL 2075652, *1 (8th Cir. July 27, 2006); United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, No. 05-3575, 
2006 WL 2241605, *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006).  
 See also United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2006) “In light of Congress’s 
explicit authorization of fast-track programs in the PROTECT Act, we cannot say that the disparity 
between Appellants’ sentences and the sentences imposed on similarly-situated defendants in fast-
track district is ‘unwarranted’ within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6).” Id. at 718. Like the Eighth Circuit, 
the Ninth Circuit immediately used the Marcial-Santiago opinion to dispose of a large number of 
similar appeals waiting in the pipeline. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes-Osorto, No. 05-30461, 2006 
WL 1666500 (9th Cir. June 9, 2006); United States v. Martinez-Huertas, No. 05-30462, 2006 WL 
1876867 (9th Cir. June 29, 2006); United States v. Castro-Muro, No. 05-30075, 2006 WL 2063063 
(9th Cir. July 26, 2006); United States v. Cruz-Lemus, No. 05-50166, 2006 WL 2087516 (9th Cir. July 
27, 2006); United States v. Martinez-De Loza, No. 05-50246, 2006 WL 2076704 (9th Cir. July 27, 
2006); United States v. Maldonado, No. 05-10227, 2006 WL 2085401 (9th Cir. July 27, 2006); United 
States v. Rondan-Villa, No. 05-10309, 2006 WL 2136148 (9th Cir. July 28, 2006); United States v. 
Hernandez-Toscano, No. 05-10228, 2006 WL 2136152 (9th Cir. July 28, 2006); United States v. 
Ramos-Contreras, No. 05-30065, 2006 WL 2099778 (9th Cir. July 28, 2006).  
 See also United States v. Aguirre-Villa, No. 05-50978, 2006 WL 2349222 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 
2006).  
We agree with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Sebastian that to require [a] district court to 
vary from the advisory guidelines based solely on the existence of early disposition programs  
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Fifth and Ninth Circuits, have now adopted the stance that because 
Congress has explicitly approved fast-track programs, the resulting 
disparities simply cannot be “unwarranted.”120 Although these circuits 
have rejected the notion that defendants have an absolute right to receive 
lower sentences, they have implicitly left the other side of the issue—
whether a reduced sentence premised on fast-track disparities could ever 
be justified—open for debate. 
The third approach, adopted by only two circuits, goes one step further 
and deems the disparities caused by fast-track to be impermissible grounds 
for reducing an illegal reentry defendant’s sentence. The arguments 
supporting this approach are exhaustively detailed by the Fourth Circuit in 
United States v. Perez-Pena.121 Ultimately, the justification for prohibiting 
sentence reductions boils down to this: “[T]o sentence defendants who 
have not been offered plea bargains as if they had been offered and had 
accepted plea bargains would effectively nullify the Government’s 
discretion to determine which defendants it wishes to receive the benefit of 
a bargain.”122 The other appellate court following this hard-line stance 
against sentence reductions is the Seventh Circuit, although the extent of 
its prohibition is unclear.123  
 
 
in other districts would conflict with the decision of Congress to limit the availability of such 
sentence reductions to select geographical areas . . . . 
Id. at *2. 
 120. The argument rests on the theory that “[t]he command that courts should consider the need to 
avoid ‘unwarranted sentence disparities,’ . . . emanates from a statute, and it is thus within the province 
of the policymaking branches of government to determine that certain disparities are warranted, and 
thus need not be avoided.” Sebastian, 436 F.3d at 916. The circuits can therefore dismiss defendants’ 
claims that courts must grant a variance based on “unwarranted sentence disparities,” because 
Congress has deemed fast-track disparities “warranted.” Id. 
 121. 453 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2006).  
 122. Id. at 243. 
 123. See Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2006)).  
“Given Congress’ explicit recognition that fast-track procedures would cause discrepancies, 
we cannot say that a sentence is unreasonable simply because it was imposed in a district that 
does not employ an early disposition program.” By the same logic, we cannot say that a 
sentence imposed after a downward departure is by itself reasonable because the district does 
not have a fast-track program. 
Id. at 555.  
 But Cf. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d at 543 (recognizing that some courts have reduced sentences 
and declining to condemn the practice as unreasonable). “That some courts have chosen to avoid 
disparity does not mean that all district courts are compelled to adjust a sentence downward from the 
advisory guidelines range in order for that sentence to be reasonable.” Id.  
 See also United States v. Salazar-Hernandez, 431 F. Supp. 2d 931 (E.D.Wis. 2006). 
[I]n [Galicia-Cardenas], the Seventh Circuit vacated a sentence based on fast-track disparity 
and remanded for re-sentencing “without a credit for Wisconsin’s lack of a fast-track 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p747 Schendel book pages.doc4/19/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
768 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:747 
 
 
 
 
With the appellate courts split on whether fast-track disparities in 
illegal reentry cases can justify downward variance from the Guidelines, 
the issue is ripe for resolution. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The two bodies of case law on the fast-track debate inhabit completely 
separate spheres of analysis. On the one hand, prosecutorial discretion and 
fast-track programs are perfectly constitutional and Congress apparently 
found no problem in 2003 with the sentencing disparities resulting from 
such programs.124 On the other hand, Congress and the Supreme Court 
have (more recently) explicitly directed district judges to consider 
disparities when sentencing federal defendants.125 How are judges to 
reconcile these competing interests? At present, it appears courts are 
avoiding that issue entirely by focusing on only one set of arguments at a 
time.126 Before a solution can be reached that promotes both goals 
(sentencing uniformity and the protection of legislative and executive 
powers), a more comprehensive discussion of the arguments for and 
against fast-track programs is required. 
 
 
program.” The court did not explain its decision, merely citing a case decided the day before 
which held that district courts are not required to account for this disparity.  
Id. at 936. 
 124. See, e.g., Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1255; Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45; Morales-
Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124. 
 125. See, e.g., Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958; Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d 728; 
Delgado, No. 6:05-cr-30-Orl-31KRS; Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943; and Peralta-Espinoza, 
383 F. Supp. 2d 1107. Congress ordered courts to reduce disparities when it passed the Federal 
Sentencing Act, particularly 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Supreme Court ordered courts to reduce 
disparities in its opinion in United States v. Booker. 
 126. See, e.g., Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 963–64 (noting that sentencing disparities are 
troubling and using 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as justification for reducing defendant’s sentence below the 
advisory Guidelines range); Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 731–32 (finding that defendant’s 
sentence must be reduced to “avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); 
Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1260–70 (refusing to consider § 3553(a) factors because Perez-
Chavez’s case was not “unusual,” and holding both that the executive branch controls prosecutorial 
discretion and that Congress has implicitly sanctioned fast-track disparities through the PROTECT 
Act); Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d at 53 (dismissing the fast-track disparity argument by stating that the 
executive branch is best suited to decide the issue); Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d at 1131 (upholding the 
district court’s refusal to reduce defendant’s sentence, on the grounds that unwarranted sentencing 
disparities are “but one of several factors for a court to consider in determining a reasonable 
sentence”); Sebastian, 436 F.3d at 916 (holding that sentencing disparities created by fast-track 
programs cannot be unwarranted because Congress recognized their potential to create disparities and 
still approved the programs, but not going so far as to prohibit fast-track disparities as grounds for a 
lower sentence); and Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d at 242–43 (reversing a district court’s decision to reduce 
defendant’s sentence on fast-track disparity grounds, and prohibiting Fourth Circuit courts from 
granting reductions in the future because it would violate separation of powers). 
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Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the fast-track debate is the way in 
which both sides can use the “disparity” argument to their advantage.127 
From the defense perspective, fast-track policies create unwarranted 
disparities by giving lower sentences to illegal reentry defendants arrested 
in districts with early disposition programs.128 From the government’s 
perspective, fast-track policies actually reduce disparities by increasing the 
number of illegal reentry prosecutions.129 Fast-track policies thus narrow 
the gap between those defendants who are prosecuted and those who are 
not (specifically, those who are not prosecuted because of scarce 
resources).130 Courts have presented yet a third angle on the disparity 
argument: giving certain defendants lower sentences (in an attempt to 
reduce disparities) may actually increase sentencing disparities, because 
other defendants nationwide will still be receiving a Guidelines range 
sentence.131  
Furthermore, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) emphasizes that 
only unwarranted sentencing disparities should be grounds for a non-
 
 
 127. See, e.g., Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (arguing that fast-tracking creates 
disparities between defendants sentenced in different districts). But see, e.g., Perez-Chavez, 422 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1262–63 (arguing that fast-tracking, because it increases overall prosecutions in 
overburdened districts, actually reduces disparities by reducing the number of persons who are not 
prosecuted at all as a result of limited resources, and that the gap between those who are prosecuted 
and those who go free is more troubling than the sentencing disparities created by fast-tracking). 
 128. See supra notes 16 and 36 and accompanying text. See also Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 
at 963 (“the amount of the fast-track sentence reduction can be substantial”). See generally Frank O. 
Bowman & et al., Panel II: The Effects of Region, Circuit, Caseload and Prosecutorial Policies on 
Disparity, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 166–67 (2003) (Professor Frank O. Bowman, arguing that local 
conditions are no excuse to deviate from the law; Assistant Federal Public Defender for the District of 
Arizona, Jon Sands, arguing that sentencing disparities created by local conditions are warranted). 
 129. See, e.g., Alan D. Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement in the Southern District 
of California, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 254, 256 (1996) (reporting that, directly following the Southern 
District of California’s adoption of a fast-track program in 1993, “the percentage of felony cases [as a 
percentage of all cases filed] rose to 55.2%, skyrocketing to 2,250 cases compared with 1,182 during 
the previous year.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1262–64 (fast-track programs “may prevent the 
even greater disparity that occurs when an offender goes unprosecuted because of the lack of 
prosecutorial resources in a district with a large volume of immigration offenses.”)  
 131. See, e.g., Banuelos-Rodriguez, 173 F.3d at 746 (“A downward departure to correct 
sentencing disparity brings a defendant’s sentence more into line with his or her codefendant’s [or 
another similarly situated defendant’s] sentence, but places it out of line with sentences imposed on all 
similar offenders in other cases . . . . The greater uniformity trumps the lesser disparity”) (quoting 
United States v. Mejia 953 F.2d. 461 (9th Cir. 1991), as amended, Mar. 25, 1992). 
 See also generally Duran, 399 F. Supp. 2d 543 (refusing to grant a downward variance on other 
grounds, but discussing the division between judges in the Southern District of New York on how fast-
track disparities should be treated, and concluding that, so long as the issue remains unresolved, the 
disparities will only become more pronounced). 
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Guidelines sentence.132 The determination of what kinds of disparities are 
in fact “unwarranted” may be more normative than the case law suggests. 
The Circuit Courts have been quick to point out that Congress, in enacting 
the PROTECT Act, implicitly approved such disparities by allowing only 
certain districts to qualify for fast-track programs.133 The implication is 
weak, however, when one considers that the Sentencing Reform Act 
(which contains 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)) was also an act of Congress, and 
(arguably) a more specific one on the issue of sentencing disparities.134 
Ultimately, the determination of whether fast-track disparities are 
“unwarranted” or “unreasonable” seems to depend on each judge’s 
personal sense of justice and fair play–hardly a uniform standard. 
Another important consideration is the fact that numerous courts cite 
deference to prosecutorial discretion as a reason for avoiding the fast-track 
issue.135 One court warned, “for the Court to depart on this basis is in 
essence a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers,” because plea 
bargaining “is the province of the executive branch.”136 These courts seem 
to believe that, if they were to find fast-track sentencing disparities 
“unwarranted,” local prosecutors would then be essentially court-ordered 
to implement a fast-track program.137 Any solution to fast-track sentencing 
disparities thus must take into account the power of the executive branch 
(specifically, the United States Attorney General) to set nationwide policy 
governing U.S. Attorneys’ charge-bargaining behavior. 
Yet another argument that can be used by both sides of the fast-track 
debate is the impact such programs have on illegal reentry deterrence. 
Proponents of fast-track programs argue that early disposition programs 
 
 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider— . . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct . . . .”). 
 133. See supra note 59. 
 134. See supra note 132. See also Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (“The fast track 
districts that rely on charge-bargaining use methodologies that permit far greater sentence reductions 
than contemplated by Congress’ directive in the PROTECT Act and the Sentencing Commission’s 
policy statement in § 5K3.1.”).  
 135. See supra note 126 (listing just a few of the opinions that have cited deference to 
prosecutorial discretion as a reason to reject defendant’s request for a lower sentence). 
 136. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d at 1129 (citations omitted). A full discussion of separation of 
powers and the impact that judicially imposed sentence reductions might have on the province of the 
executive branch is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 137. This result does not appear to have occurred in any of the districts where courts have found 
disparities to be unwarranted. Neither the Eastern District of Wisconsin (see Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. 
Supp. 2d 958), nor the Eastern District of Virginia (see Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 3d 728), nor 
the Middle District of Florida (see Delgado, No. 6:05-cr-30-ORL-31KRS) nor the Northern District of 
Illinois (see Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943) have made moves to implement fast-track 
programs in the wake of decisions rendering sentencing disparities “unwarranted.”  
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improve deterrence by increasing the likelihood that illegal reentry 
offenders will be prosecuted.138 Opponents, however, could easily claim 
the reverse effect: faced with shorter sentences if apprehended, more 
aliens might choose to risk illegal reentry than before.139 If, as reports 
suggest, the number of illegal immigrants in districts with fast-track 
programs continues to climb, opponents of fast-track may have the better 
of these two arguments.140 However, the growth in illegal immigration is a 
complex issue, and it seems too simple to attribute the increased flow of 
illegal reentrants to fast-track policies alone. 
Finally, some observers may find fast-track programs disturbing 
because they present an abbreviated form of justice.141 Defendants who 
plead guilty are receiving shorter sentences, but they are also giving up 
their right to file pretrial motions, to have an accurate pre-sentence report 
 
 
 138. See Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (“Fast-track programs arguably serve the goal of 
deterrence by expediting the processing of cases, thereby allowing prosecutors to bring more charges 
against more immigration offenders than would otherwise be possible.”). 
 139. Fast-track programs may create particularly perverse incentives by attracting illegal 
reentrants to the very districts where prosecutors and local resources are already overwhelmed by large 
illegal immigrant populations. 
 140. See generally Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America’s 
Foreign-Born Population in 2005 (2005), http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1405.pdf. “Between 
January 2000 and March 2005, 7.9 million new immigrants (legal and illegal) settled in the country, 
making it the highest five-year period of immigration in American history.” Id. at 1. While it is 
unlikely that the increase in illegal immigration is due entirely to first-time entrants, the percentage of 
this increase that is due to repeat entrants is not known at this time. “States with the largest increase in 
immigrants are California, Texas, Georgia, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Washington, Virginia, Arizona, Tennessee, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina, and 
Mississippi.” Id. at 2. 
 On the other hand, the persistent increase in illegal immigration might justify the ongoing use of 
fast-track programs in order to reduce caseloads and preserve prosecutorial resources in the districts 
listed above. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 141. Professor Stephen Legomsky expressed trepidation that a nationwide fast-track program 
would be trading justice for efficiency on a grand scale. Interview with Stephen H. Legomsky, Charles 
F. Nagel Professor of International and Comparative Law, Washington University in St. Louis School 
of Law, in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 18, 2006). A full discussion of the concept of “abbreviated justice” and 
its implications for illegal reentrants is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 “Trading justice for efficiency” does provide illegal reentry defendants with one significant 
benefit: rather than waiting months to enter a guilty plea through the normal procedures, fast-track 
programs expedite the entire process and allow defendants to begin serving their sentences 
immediately. For example, after the Southern District of California implemented fast-track, the 
average length of time from filing to disposition in a criminal felony case (of which immigration 
offenses made up sixty-five percent in 2004) dropped from 4 months in 2001 to 3.3 months in 2004. 
See Federal Court Management Statistics 2004 District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cmsd2004.pl (choose “California Southern” in the drop-down menu; then click “Generate” button). 
A similar trend can be seen in New Mexico, where the time period from filing to disposition dropped 
from 4.5 months to 3.7 months after the district implemented a fast-track program (in New Mexico, 
immigration offenses accounted for sixty percent of all criminal felony charges in 2004). See id. 
(choose “New Mexico” in the drop-down menu: then click “Generate” button). 
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prepared about them, and to appear before a jury of their peers and make a 
case for leniency or even innocence.142 Perhaps the criminal justice system 
should not be circumvented in this way.143 Early dispositions programs are 
especially troubling when one considers that the participants are illegal 
aliens, who are likely to have little familiarity with their rights in the 
American legal system and speak English as a second language or not at 
all.144 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Each branch of the United States Government possesses the ability to 
resolve fast-track disparities currently endured by illegal reentry 
defendants. Under the status quo, the solution is left to the judiciary. 
Defendants in non-fast-track districts must raise the “disparity as grounds 
for leniency” argument in each illegal reentry case. In those districts where 
a circuit court ruling has not barred the issue,145 district judges are 
theoretically free to impose more lenient sentences whenever they find 
fast-track disparities to be “unwarranted” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 
Parts II and III of this Note demonstrate that the judiciary-based solution is 
currently failing to resolve district-to-district sentencing disparities. 
Therefore, a legislative or executive solution is necessary.  
The executive branch’s current policy (more specifically, the United 
States Attorney General’s current policy) is to officially approve any fast-
track program that meets the criteria established by former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft’s 2003 memo.146 The memo allows only those 
districts with unusually high illegal reentry caseloads to initiate early 
disposition proceedings.147 If the Attorney General were to remove the 
requirements for implementing such a program (allowing all districts to 
qualify), greater uniformity could eventually be achieved as ordinary 
 
 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 143. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal 
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005) (discussing the shortfalls of plea bargaining as a 
method of obtaining justice). 
 144. As reported by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), the 2000 Census 
revealed that “[m]ore than 10.5 million U.S. residents speak little or no English at home. Nearly one 
third of those people live in California, where 1 in 9 people over age five has limited proficiency in 
English.” http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_researchb4ea.  
 145. The Tenth Circuit (Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124), and (arguably) the First Circuit 
(Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45 and Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22) have held that fast-track disparities 
are not grounds for a more lenient sentence than the Guidelines recommend. The issue appears to be 
undecided in the other ten circuits, however. 
 146. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 64. 
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districts adopted fast-track programs of their own.148 An even better 
solution would be for the Attorney General to mandate the creation of 
such programs in every district. The PROTECT Act does not prohibit such 
an action,149 and the Attorney General certainly has the authority to set 
nationwide charge-bargaining practices.150 
Despite the attractiveness of the executive branch solution, a third 
remedy is even more desirable. A major roadblock to judicial recognition 
of the fast-track argument was the apparent congressional approval of fast-
track disparities under the PROTECT Act.151 If Congress were to pass a 
law explicitly denouncing such disparities and directing the Attorney 
General to promulgate a nationwide fast-track program, most of the 
concerns raised in Part III of this Note would be alleviated.152 Thus, the 
proposal I advance is a nationwide fast-track policy, explicitly sanctioned 
by Congress and with parameters set by the Attorney General.153 
The controversy over whether fast-track policies reduce or exacerbate 
disparities would become moot if every federal district employed an early 
disposition program. From the defense perspective, the fate of illegal 
reentry defendants would no longer be determined by something as 
arbitrary as geography.154 From the government perspective, a nationwide 
fast-track policy would allow more prosecutions, and would reduce the 
government’s perceived disparity between those offenders who are 
punished and those who are not.155 
 
 
 148. If all or most districts implemented fast-track policies for illegal reentry offenders, the 
disparity between those sentenced in fast-track districts and those sentenced elsewhere would narrow. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know which districts would choose to adopt a fast-track policy and 
when they would eventually do so. 
 149. See supra notes 58–59. 
 150. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 126. 
 152. Contrary to what some courts contend this would not be a major about-face for Congress. 
Congress was in fact so disturbed by sentencing disparities at the time of the PROTECT Act’s passage 
that it ordered a comprehensive report from the United States Sentencing Commission on why such 
disparities exist. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DOWNWARD 
DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 401(M) OF PUB. 
LAW 108–21) (2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 137 (2003). 
 153. A nationwide fast-track policy would extend the following benefits throughout the country: 
Given the explosion in the number of illegal reentry cases in certain districts, the lack of 
resources to handle and prosecute all of these cases, and the need to deter aliens from entering 
and reentering the United States, the fast-track programs provide a necessary and prudent 
means to achieve the criminal goals relating to punishment and deterrence of aliens charged 
with illegal reentry. 
Government Krukowski Memo, supra note 10, at 22. 
 154. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 130. It is certainly still up for debate whether more prosecutions of illegal 
reentrants are a good thing.  
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The debate over whether fast-track disparities are “unwarranted” would 
also be rendered moot by a nationwide fast-track program. Congressional 
intent would no longer be in conflict with the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), and courts would no longer be forced to choose between 
incompatible arguments.156 Similarly, courts will no longer be faced with 
the Hobson’s choice of allowing fast-track disparity to continue, or 
unconstitutionally encroaching on the sphere of executive power.157 If 
Congress directs the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines for a 
nationwide fast-track program, prosecutorial discretion is preserved.158 
Unfortunately, a nationwide fast-track policy would not settle the 
debate about deterrence impacts. However, it may allow for better study 
on the subject. With only thirteen fast-track programs in place today, the 
effects such programs have on overall immigration policy could be hard 
for researchers to isolate. If the entire country were to implement early 
disposition programs for illegal reentry, the impact could be more easily 
observed.  
Extending fast-track programs nationwide would also fail to alleviate 
concerns about fast-tracking as a form of “abbreviated justice.”159 
However, plea-bargaining is a highly entrenched element of the American 
justice system, and it seems unlikely that further entrenchment would have 
any additional impact.160 
 
 
 156. See supra note 126 for a brief synopsis of cases choosing one of several incompatible 
arguments. 
 157. See supra notes 136 and accompanying text. 
 158. This assertion may at first blush sound contradictory. How can prosecutorial discretion be 
protected if Congress is ordering the Attorney General to enact a charge-bargaining policy? The 
answer lies in how the fast-track programs are administered. Rather than forcing prosecutors to offer 
fast-tracking to every illegal reentry defendant, the government remains free to extend the benefits of 
the program at their discretion.  
 However, although fast-track programs are discretionary in the manner described, in practice they 
have been utilized broadly and uniformly. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 
401(M) OF PUB. LAW 108–21) (2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 139 (2003). 
 159. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a 
“discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these 
difficult choices [is] an inevitable”—and permissible—“attribute of any legitimate system 
which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.” It follows that, by tolerating and 
encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally 
legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade 
the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Fast-track programs for illegal reentry offenders serve a valuable 
purpose in the thirteen federal districts where they have been 
implemented. Early disposition programs have made a noticeable impact 
both from the defendant’s point of view (shorter sentences), and from the 
government’s perspective (more prosecutions at a lower cost). Fast-track 
policies thus represent a middle ground between law-and-order interests 
and the rights of the accused. They should be promoted and protected, 
especially in a post-Booker world where the parties are no longer tethered 
to a mandatory Guideline scheme. Unfortunately, the sentencing 
disparities created by the currently employed fast-track programs are 
unwarranted, and may create perverse incentives for illegal reentrants. In 
order to both promote fast-track programs and reduce the unwarranted 
sentencing disparities created by them, a nationwide fast-track program 
should be sanctioned by Congress and promulgated by the Attorney 
General. This solution will restore sentencing uniformity to the crime of 
illegal reentry. 
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